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When Courts Come Knocking At The
Cult's Door: Religious Cults And The
First Amendment
by CRAIG ANDREWS PARTON*
I
Introduction
[T]he wrong of these things, as I see it, is not in the money
the victims part with half so much as in the mental and spiri-
tual poison they get. But that is precisely the thing the Consti-
tution put beyond the reach of the prosecutor, for the price of
freedom of religion or of speech or of the press is that we must
put up with, and even pay for, a good deal of rubbish ....
Justice Jackson in United States v. Ballard.1
Nathan2 is a second semester freshman at Indiana Univer-
sity. One day while studying in the university commons, Na-
than is approached by Jodi, an affable female who also claims
to be a student. The conversation revolves around several sub-
jects of concern to Nathan-the arms race, world hunger, and
the moral dilemmas of life. Jodi explains that she belongs to a
group that, oddly enough, has the same concerns as Nathan. By
coincidence, the group is having a dinner and discussion that
very evening.
* Member, Third Year Class; B.A., California Polytechnic University, 1977;
M.A., The Simon Greenleaf School of Law, 1984. The author wishes to express his
appreciation to Ellen Parton whose efforts made this manuscript possible: Hoc opus,
hic labor est.
1. 332 U.S. 78, 95 (1944).
2. The following allegory is a compilation of fact patterns outlined in the follow-
ing sources: R. ENROTH, YOUTH, BRAINWASHING AND THE EXTREMIST CULTS (1977);
Delgado, Cults and Conversion: The Case for Informed Consent, 16 GA. L. REV. 533,
546-50 (1982); Lenz, The Moonie Life-And How One Left It, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT, July 5, 1982, at 41.
3. See Smith, Inside the Boonville Training Center: A Weekend with Moonies,
San Francisco Chron., Dec. 11, 1975, at 1, 10, col. 1 (recruit subject to "love bombing" in
order to lower resistance - "I was told I looked intelligent, had a happy face, my
sweater was beautiful, my shoes were nice, and I was unique."); Delgado, supra note 2,
at 546 n.78; C. STONER & J. PARKE, ALL GOD'S CHILDREN 6-8 (1977) (cult proselytizers
often take advantage of adolescent idealism).
COMM/ENT L. J.
Nathan attends the gathering and meets several people who
act as though Nathan were a long-time family friend.4 After
dinner, Nathan sits spellbound as a charismatic lecturer speaks
on the precise issues that Nathan finds most significant and dis-
turbing. The name of the group is never mentioned. Nathan is
invited to a three-day workshop where, it is promised, he will
get final answers to his questions.5
At the retreat, the level of the activities quickens at a calcu-
lated pace. Though there are a plethora of stimulating lectures,
Nathan finds himself playing games, singing, chanting, and in-
teracting in small-group "therapy sessions." It never strikes
Nathan as peculiar that he is rarely left alone to reflect on the
viewpoint being presented. Whenever Nathan inquires as to
the nature of the group and its "leader" he is told that all his
questions will eventually be answered at the final meeting on
Sunday night.
By Sunday night, Nathan has reached an emotional zenith.
He does not realize that he has slept a total of only eight hours
all weekend and has only eaten two meals each day. As far as
he is concerned, he has met a group of like-minded people who
display a complete acceptance of his views and lifestyle.7
When the time for a decision arrives, Nathan is ready. He
totally commits himself to the group and enters into a monas-
tic- type lifestyle. He moves into the group house, begins listen-
ing to hours of taped lectures by the leader, solicits funds and
new recruits for the organization, and survives on three hours
of sleep a day.8 Nathan gets a new haircut and begins to wear
4. See Note, To Keep Them Out of Harm's Way? Temporary Conservatorships
and Religious Sects, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 845, 847 (1978) ("Unification Church recruiters
often approach persons on the street - especially persons who appear lonely or de-
pressed - and speak to them about a loving communal group. The recruiters invite
prospective members to a church house for dinner; prospective members are then told
how much they are loved and needed, and are made to feel part of a special group
whose mission is to save the world").
5. See R. ENROTH, supra note 2, at 102 ("We had the whole thing choreo-
graphed.... The ... purpose was to put the hook in, to discover what would grab them
emotionally."); Lenz, supra note 2, at 41.
6. See Konte, Looking For God In All The Wrong Places, San Francisco Chron.,
Sept. 15, 1985 (This World), at 10, col. 2 (An ex-Unification Church member com-
mented, "I'd been isolated mentally, isolated physically, isolated culturally. There
was no breathing space").
7. See Note, supra note 4, at 847.
8. See Driver, Why A Portland Jury Awarded $39 Million In Damages Against
One of the World's Most Profitable Cults, WILLAMETTE WEEK, May 30, 1985, at 7 (con-
cerning training techniques of L. Ron Hubbard's Church of Scientology: "The kids
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distinctive clothing. His relationship with his parents increas-
ingly deteriorates as all ties with his past are systematically cut
off.9 Conversion is complete.
Nathan's case is repeated hundreds of times each day. The
extreme demands, and often questionable recruiting practices,
of religious cults1" have spurred a barrage of legal attacks.
This note will outline the contours of that attack and the im-
plications these efforts have for the first amendment's protec-
tion of religious expression. Particular attention will be given
[many are in their 20s] are made to work 14, 18 hours a day. They are brought very
high with clapping and yelling about how great a job they are doing and hit really
hard at other times. It's a tremendous handling of rewards and punishment.... The
kids can never live up to L. Ron Hubbard. That's how he is made to feel. But at the
same time, Ron writes beautiful, flowery prose at times, just praising them, you know.
It's very clever."); Delgado, supra note 2, at 548 n.86 (fasting, hunger, and weakness
among Unification Church devotees); Rudin, The Cult Phenomenon: Fad or Fact?, 9
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 17, 27 (1979-1980) (cult members often forced to work
18 to 20 hours a day, seven days a week).
9. See Rudin, supra note 8, at 25 (cults undermine "all past psychological support
systems" and may even forbid contact with parents); Peterson v. Sorlien, 299 N.W.2d
123, 126-27 (Minn. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S 1031 (1981) (woman involved with cult
called "The Way International" exhibited a decline in academic performance, severe
exhaustion and irritability, and "increasing alienation from [her] family"); Christoff-
erson v. Church of Scientology, 57 Or. App. 203, 208, 644 P.2d 577, 582 (1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983) (Scientology member told to "handle her parents" or else
"disconnect" from them-for more on Christofferson, see infra note 27).
10. Any discussion of religious cults immediately forces one against seemingly in-
surmountable definitional problems. The term "cult" is often used as a pejorative by
those who have an interest in identifying nonorthodox belief systems. See Wood, New
Religions and the First Amendment, 24 J. CH. & STATE 455, 460 (1982) ("The use of
the term 'cult,' which is a pejorative word used to denigrate new religions, has no
place in American law").
For purposes of this note, "cult" will be defined as any religious group that differs
in some significant respect, as to belief or practice, from those religious groups which
are regarded as the normative expressions of religion in our culture. See Pfeffer,
Equal Protection for Unpopular Sects, 9 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 9, 10 (1979-
1980) ("In reality, every new faith group challenging existing faiths is condemned and
fought by the established faiths."); W. MARTIN, THE KINGDOM OF THE CULTS 11 (1985)
(Martin is widely considered to be one of the leading authorities on the theology of
the cults); Delgado, When Religious Exercise Is Not Free: Deprogramming and the
Constitutional Status of Coercively Induced Belief, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1071, 1072 n.2
(1984); Aronin, Cults, Deprogramming, and Guardianship: A Model Legislative Pro-
posal, 17 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 163 n.1 (1982).
Moreover, cults are characterized by devoted attachment to a person or principle,
and most are religious in nature. Peterson v. Sorlien, 299 N.W.2d 123, 126 (Minn.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981) ("The word 'cult' is not used pejoratively but
in its dictionary sense to describe an unorthodox system of belief characterized by
[g]reat or excessive devotion to some person, idea, or thing." (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 552 (1976)).
See also Case Comment, Tort Liability for Cult Deprogramming, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 465,
466 (1982).
COMM/ENT L. J.
to a recent proposal by UCLA law professor Richard Delgado
that would require religious groups to obtain a recruit's "in-
formed consent" before proceeding with proselytizing. The
note argues that existing civil and criminal remedies provide
adequate tools with which to deal with the abuses of religious
cults, and that recently proposed remedies, such as court-or-
dered conservatorships granted for the purpose of deprogram-
ming a cult member, are a severe threat to civil liberties in
general and religious freedom in particular.
The second section of this note is necessarily critical of cult
practices. One who is interested only in researching the abuses
of the cults will find much grist for his mill. However, the
point of such a cataloguing of horrors is two-fold: (1) it aids in
understanding the burgeoning call for some type of statutory or
constitutionally-based control of cult practices; and (2) it may
provide some assurance to my critics that I am well aware of
the truly frightening aspects of many of today's cults and yet
still advocate the vigorous application of first amendment prin-
ciples to this controversial area.
If it can be said that many are the law journal articles and
notes which have built up a legal strawman in order to destroy
him with equally spurious refutations, then this note may suf-
fer from a reverse malady. In an attempt to present the abuses
of the cults that have resulted in a wide variety of legal re-
sponses, this note may appear to have proven too much. Many
may read the section entitled "Cults As Power Brokers" and
conclude that drastic legal remedies, such as those proposed by
some academics, are indeed warranted. However, one should
constantly query whether such abuses can be adequately ad-
dressed under existing civil and criminal remedies without the
inevitable result of such "solutions"-emasculation of the first
amendment.
II
Cults As Power Brokers
Cults enjoyed a precipitous rise in popularity in the late 1960s
and 1970s"1 as spiritual seekers swarmed to religious systems
that offered acceptance, purpose, and philosophical coherence
11. The popularity of cults in the late 1960s has been traced to the indiscriminate
American love affair with any type of human potential movement. Case Comment,
supra note 10, at 465-66.
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in a world which seemed devoid of all three. The 1970s ushered
in the so-called "culture of narcissism"" which, when com-
bined with incidents such as the Jonestown tragedy,13 seriously
eroded the appeal of individuals or groups that asked for severe
self-sacrifice.
The 1980s, however, have brought a resurgence in the vitality
of the cult population. 4 Estimates of the number of cult groups
range from a minimum of 200 to as many as 3000, with a total
population of about three million.15 These cults often wield a
financial and political power which many find disturbing. 6
12. C. LASCH, THE CULTURE OF NARCISSISM (1978).
13. See Wood, supra note 10, at 457 ("The Jonestown massacre of 18 November
1978, involving Jim Jones and his People's Temple movement, accelerated an attitude
of popular unacceptability toward new religions").
14. This recent growth in the cult population has been linked with the personal
instability caused by the current "social transition." See J. CLARK, M. LAGONE, R.
SCHECTER & R. DALY, DESTRUCTIVE CULT CONVERSION: THEORY, RESEARCH AND
TREATMENT 44 (1981) (loss of "cultural confidence" has resulted in increasing cult
popularity); L. STREIKER, THE GOSPEL TIME BOMB: ULTRAFUNDAMENTALISM AND THE
FUTURE OF AMERICA 174 (1984) ("Religious cults and ultrafundamentalist sects arose
as part of our stumbling in the midst of political assassinations, racial violence, infla-
tion, the Vietnam war, the counterculture, women's liberation, and the failings of
technology. Cults and sects articulate the national confusion, build upon the confu-
sion, and, each in their own way, attempt to transcend the confusion."); West & Del-
gado, Psyching Out the Cults' Collective Mania, Los Angeles Times, Nov. 26, 1978,
Part VII at 1, col. 1 (cults grow fastest in periods of social turbulence and transition).
15. See F. CONWAY & J. SIEGELMAN, SNAPPING: AMERICA'S EPIDEMIC OF SUDDEN
PERSONALITY CHANGE 12 (1978) (at least three million past and present cult mem-
bers); Grafstein, Messianic Capitalism: The Invisible Hand That Feeds The Cults, THE
NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 29, 1984, at 14 (approximately 3000 cults, with membership esti-
mated at anywhere between three and thirteen million); Lenz, supra note 2, at 41
(approximately 3000 cults).
16. The net worth of L. Ron Hubbard's Church of Scientology has been put at
$400 million, with its assets including a 57 acre estate in England, six buildings in
California (including the Cedars of Lebanon Hospital complex), and a large vessel
named Apollo. See Grafstein, supra note 15, at 15; Driver, supra note 8, at 7; Rudin,
supra note 8, at 22 n.28. It is now apparently settled that the reclusive Mr. Hubbard
died in February of 1986. See Hopkins, The Founder of Scientology Is Dead At 74,
CHRISTIANITY TODAY, March 7, 1986, at 52.
Rev. Moon's Unification Church assets include ownership of 10 Uruguayan newspa-
pers, $75 million in New York real estate (including a 48 acre estate in Westchester
County, New York and a 255 acre estate in Tarryton, New York), a printing company,
restaurants, fishing companies, and, oddly enough, an armaments manufacturing
company. In addition, Moon and the Church have a political voice by way of their
ownership of The Washington Times. See Grafstein, supra note 15, at 15-16; Rudin,
supra note 8, at 27 n.66 (citing Warren, Moonies: Millions of Members - and Dollars,
Chi. Sun-Times, July 8, 1979, at 1); Rudin, supra note 8, at 21 n.28. For an account of
Rev. Moon's problems with the Internal Revenue Service, see Religious Martyr or
Tax Cheat?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 28, 1984, at 14.
The International Society for Krishna Consciousness (known as the Hare Krishnas)
owns farms in India, Italy, France, England, Canada, Brazil, Australia, and New Zea-
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Commensurate with their financial wealth, today's cults dis-
play what many consider to be an alarming amount of power
and control over the lives of their devotees. This combination
of financial and psychological power is a distinguishing mark of
today's cults.17
In addition, the following characteristics tend to typify the
modern-day cults:
1. Cult members swear a total allegiance to a single "en-
lightened" leader who in turn provides rules for daily life.18
2. Criticism is frowned on within cults, and the groups are
often anti-intellectual, stressing emotional experience. Sub-
mission to the leader and his teaching is of foremost
importance. 19
3. Familial dependence on the cult leaders is fostered by iso-
lating devotees from healthy contact with the world and by
convincing the follower that all answers are found within the
four corners of the cult.
2 °
4. A consistent dosage of nonsensical verbiage is hurled at
land, as well as six farms in the United States. In addition, the cult owns a gold-leaf
and marble temple in West Virginia worth millions of dollars and numerous buildings
in Los Angeles, as well as estates in West Germany and England. The Hare Krishnas
recently completed a $8 million dollar palace in Northern California. See Grafstein,
supra note 15, at 15; Rudin, supra note 8, at 21 n.28.
The Way International owns $8 million dollars worth of property in seven states, as
well as its own police department and weapons training center at its 155 acre center in
Knoxville, Ohio. See Grafstein, supra note 15, at 15; Rudin, supra note 8, at 21 n.28.
The now deported Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh's 64,000 acre estate in Antelope, Ore-
gon (Rancho Rajneesh) housed Rajneesh International Meditation University, the
Rajneesh Buddhafield Garage, the Rajneesh Boutique, the Rajneesh Bakery and Cafe,
the Rajneesh Restaurant and Nightclub, and Hotel Rajneesh and Air Rajneesh. The
cult also owned 68 Rolls Royces. The Bhagwan's empire is now in shambles after the
guru was forced to leave this country permanently after pleading guilty to charges of
violating immigration laws. See Karlen, Bhagwan's Realm, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 3, 1984,
at 34; Grafstein, supra note 15, at 14-16; Karlen, Busting the Bhagwan: The Swami of
Sex Is Arrested in North Carolina, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 11, 1985, at 26; Farewell To
Rancho Raineesh, TIME, Dec. 9, 1985, at 38.
17. Rudin, supra note 8, at 24-25; Panel Discussion: Effects of Cult Membership
and Activities, 9 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 91, 107 (1980-81) (D. Richards, moder-
ator) (Volume 9 of the New York University Review of Law and Social Change was
devoted solely to the problems related to religious cults and is an invaluable source
for anyone working in the field).
18. See Case Comment, supra note 10, at 466.
19. C. STONER & J. PARKE, supra note 3, at 4; Aronin, supra note 10, at 172 (vet-
eran cult members bombard the convert with affection when unquestioning obedi-
ence is shown).
20. See F. CONWAY & J. SIEGELMAN, supra note 15, at 170; Rudin, supra note 8, at
25-26; Aronin, supra note 10, at 176.
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devotees, resulting in the psychological vulnerability of the re-
cruits.2 ' Guilt manipulation is commonplace, and some cults
even threaten to use the "confessions" of the member for
blackmail purposes if the convert ever leaves "the flock.
22
5. Followers may spend enormous amounts of time each
week soliciting funds. New converts sometimes become slave-
labor, and are rewarded for their efforts by receiving the "privi-
lege" of watching their leader drive by in a Rolls Royce.23
6. Cults are often highly sexist and anti-family. Women are
seen as reproductive machines, and are often relegated to
subordinate positions.24 The cult group is the family and thus
biological family bonds are discouraged. Children are some-
times severely disciplined.25
7. Cults view themselves as involved in a world struggle
against evil and thus they teach that the ends usually justify
the means. Cult members are often encouraged to practice de-
ceit, and to use fraudulent methods in order to solicit contribu-
tions and secure converts.26
21. See C. EDWARDS, CRAZY FOR GOD 31 (1979) (A former Unification Church
member relates how helpless and vulnerable he felt during a game he played while
being recruited: "During the entire game our team chanted loudly, 'Bomb with Love,
Blast with Love,' as the soft, round balls volleyed back and forth. Again I felt lost and
confused, angry, remote, and helpless, for the game had started without an explana-
tion of the rules").
22. The Church of Scientology has reportedly practiced a method of blackmail
quite regularly. Disclosures made by Scientologists to "counselors" were "maintained
in special files and used to control the Scientologists as long as they remained in the
organization and - if they decided to leave - even afterward." Driver, supra note 8,
at 6.
23. See Karlen, supra note 16, at 34 (Rajneesh owned 68 Rolls Royces); Konte,
supra note 6, at 10, col. 1, 4 (one former Unification Church member recalls selling
flowers for 19 hours at one stretch. Another recounts making $100 to $200 a day sell-
ing flowers during the week, and making as much as $500 a day on weekends. She
later concluded, "I didn't want to subject somebody else to this degrading lifestyle.
Subsequently, I realized that maybe, just maybe, I had more of a calling in life than
selling dead roses").
24. Rudin, supra note 8, at 27 n.65 (citing Flynn, The Subordinate Role of
Khrishna Women, Rocky Mountain News, April 10, 1979, at 42 (women forced to do
degrading menial tasks)).
25. A 14-year-old in the Church of God claimed she was raped when she dis-
obeyed a church leader. See Rudin, supra note 8, at 28.
Children in the Church of Armaggedon who wet their beds or who were disobedi-
ent were locked in closets. See Panel Discussion: Regulation of Alternative Religions
By Law or Private Action: Can and Should We Regulate?, 9 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 109, 114 (1979-80) (Redlich, moderator); Rudin, supra note 8, at 28. Jim
Jones had disobedient children and teenagers disciplined with electric shocks. See
Rudin, supra note 8, at 28.
26. For example, ex-Church of Scientologists who criticize the church may be la-
COMM/ENT L. J. [Vol. 9:279
A more thorough cataloguing of cult practices would be an
effort beyond the scope of this note. Examples of deceptive cul-
tic practices are legion,27 and provide a glimpse into the mo-
tives and practices of those at the highest echelons of many of
the leading cults in this country. Indeed, they serve to explain
the current barrage of legal attacks seen today.
III
The Cults In The Dock
Prosecutions of this character easily could degenerate into
religious persecution.
Justice Jackson in United States v. Ballard.8
belled "fair game." According to a policy letter from the late L. Ron Hubbard, those
who are fair game may be deprived of property or injured by any means by any
Scientologist. Former members may be "tricked, sued, lied to or destroyed." See
Driver, supra note 8, at 7; Lerner, Is Ron Hubbard Dead?, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 6, 1982, at
125 (Hubbard's son says the "fair game doctrine" began in 1967 and the security and
intelligence network of the church is run like the Nazi's SS corps).
27. Julie Christofferson Titchbourne's experience with the Church of Scientology
serves as an illustration of the worst in cult practices. Testimony at trial revealed that
Ms. Christofferson came in contact with the Church while in Portland in 1975.
Scientology members encouraged Julie to enroll in an "introductory communica-
tions" course. Christofferson was told that L. Ron Hubbard, the mastermind behind
the course, had a degree from George Washington University and had attended
Princeton. In addition, Scientologists told Christofferson that Hubbard chose to live
on a subsistence income.
At trial, evidence was produced showing that Hubbard completed less than two
years at GWU, and that he received numerous D's and F's. Further testimony re-
vealed that Hubbard had never attended Princeton and that his Ph.D was from a
mail-order diploma mill. The claim that Hubbard lived on a subsistence income was
refuted when a former Hubbard aide testified that during a six-month period in 1982
he personally supervised the transfer of $34 million from church coffers to the per-
sonal account of L. Ron Hubbard. Leeson, $39M Verdict in Scientology Case Re-
versed, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 12, 1985, at 5, col. 1, 6.
Christofferson's original suit was remanded for a new trial by the Oregon Court of
Appeals. Christofferson v. Church of Scientology, 30 Or. App. 203, 644 P.2d 577 (1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983). The new trial resulted in a $39 million jury verdict
against the Church of Scientology. See Driver, supra note 8, at 1. The verdict was set
aside by Judge Donald Londer on the grounds that Christofferson's attorney made
prejudicial statements in his closing argument. A new trial was ordered. See Leeson,
supra, at 5, col. 1.
Hubbard's own son called his father "one of the biggest con men of this century."
Lerner, supra note 26, at 125. See also Scientology's Profits, CHRISTIAN CENTURY,
Sept. 26, 1984, at 865, col. 2 (quoting the comments of Los Angeles County Superior
Court Judge Paul G. Breckenridge, Jr., made after a lengthy trial involving
Scientology members: "The evidence portrays a man [Hubbard] who has been virtu-
ally a pathological liar when it comes to his history, background and achievements").
28. 322 U.S. 78, 95 (1944).
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A. Deprogramming As A Legal Catharsis
The legal response to the cults has come from a variety of
aggrieved parties. The remedy often sought by the parents of
those involved in cults is that of deprogramming.29
In the late 1970s, the American Civil Liberties Union esti-
mated that five to ten deprogrammings occurred each week.3
Ted Patrick, a San Diego-based deprogrammer, boasts of
deprogramming over 2000 cult members.3 1 His method is seen
as reliable (over ninety percent never return to that particular
cult3 2 ) and swift (deprogramming normally takes from three to
fifteen days33).
Notwithstanding their effectiveness, Ted Patrick's tech-
niques display an alarming disregard for the dignity of the peo-
ple he is deprogramming. It is not uncommon for brutal force
to be used to abduct the cult member, followed by the basest
sort of "reverse brainwashing. ' 34 Patrick prides himself on his
use of profanity and force in deprogramming, and his impres-
sive statistics seem to support his exorbitant fees.3 5 Recent
studies, however, indicate that those who leave cults via
deprogramming are more apt to become involved again in an
authoritarian religious group than those who leave the group
29. Case Comment, supra note 10, at 468.
30. Religious Cults: Is The Wild ling Over?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,
March 27, 1978, at 44.
31. T. PATRICK & T. DULACK, LET OUR CHILDREN Go 69 (1976).
32. However, Dr. John G. Clark, Assistant Clinical Professor of Psychiatry at
Harvard Medical School, claims that some cult members reach a point at which they
cannot be returned to normality, and thus are subject to joining one cult after an-
other. Buel, The Cults In Court, 2 CAL. LAW. 56, 57-58 (July/August 1982).
33. Case Comment, supra note 10, at 469.
34. Buel, supra note 32, at 61 ("In a sworn affidavit widely circulated by the Unifi-
cation Church, Andrew Wilson (a New York follower of Reverend Moon) charges
Patrick with describing Moon (in a deprogramming session) as Satan incarnate, a
pimp and a snake, and of accusing Wilson of being insane, a zombie and a prostitute").
35. Patrick recounts the response of Ed Painter, an assistant in deprogramming,
to a cult member's attempted escape: "At this, Ed Painter got furious and cocked his
arm as if to lay Ed [the cult member] out cold. I managed to push him out of the way
just in time." While pinning the cult member to the wall, Patrick said, "You listen to
me! You so much as wiggle your toes again, I'm gonna put my fist down your throat."
T. PATRICK & T. DULACK, supra note 31, at 189.
Lowell Streiker records an interesting conversation that he had with Harley Davis,
a former Patrick aide: "Do you know how much Ted [Patrick] was making?" Davis
asked. Without pausing for a response from me, he declared, "One year he declared
$191,000 on his income tax. He lied. His take was more than twice that. Deprogram-
ming is strictly a cash business." L. STREIKER, THE FUNDAMENTALIST TIME BOMB:
ULTRAFUNDAMENTALISM AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICA 17 (1984).
COMM/ENT L. J. [Vol. 9:279
voluntarily.3 6
Deprogramming efforts have been the source of much litiga-
tion. Cult members have even been successful in alleging a
cause of action under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (also known
as the Ku Klux Klan Act), with damages being awarded under
42 U.S.C. section 1985(3).
37
In an action under section 1985(3), a plaintiff must show that
a conspiracy has taken place for the purpose of depriving him,
or a class in which he is a part, of the equal protection of the
law. The most difficult hurdle in a section 1985(3) suit is show-
ing that the defendant's actions constitute a "class-based, invid-
iously discriminatory animus.' ' 38 In addition, the type of
constitutional violation envisioned in section 1985(3) has been
held by the courts to include the right to interstate travel and
the prohibition against involuntary servitude contained in the
36. Clinical psychologist Dick Anthony, who has had wide exposure to those who
have gone through deprogramming, made the following statement at the New York
University colloquim on Alternative Religions: "I want to point out my views on this.
I really am worried that people do not see that deprogramming often has the result of
driving families further apart. People go to deprogramming but they have not dealt
with the original problem. They therefore cannot be successfully deprogrammed.
They will only become attached to another cult, or will go back to the same cult; in
any case, they will not stay away from an authoritarian group." Panel Discussion,
supra note 25, at 123. However, Margaret Singer, Professor of Psychology at the Uni-
versity of California, Berkeley, has counselled over 7000 cult members, and has con-
cluded that those who underwent deprogramming are far healthier than those who
quit on their own. See Buel, supra note 32, at 58.
37. The full text of the statute is as follows:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise
on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving,
either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal pro-
tection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or
for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any
State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or
Territory the equal protection of the laws; or if two or more persons conspire
to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully enti-
tled to vote, from giving his support or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or
in favor of the election of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for Pres-
ident or Vice President, or as a Member of Congress of the United States; or
to injure any citizen in person or property on account of such support or ad-
vocacy; in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more per-
sons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the
object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or prop-
erty, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of
the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the
recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any
one or more of the conspirators.
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1983).
38. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971).
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thirteenth amendment.
39
However, in Ward v. Conner,40 the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit expanded the class of persons protected by the
statute to include an adult member of a religious group who
was kidnapped and held captive by his parents in an attempt to
deprogram him of his aberrant beliefs. The Fourth Circuit held
that section 1985(3) applies to private conspiracies which inter-
fere with a person's religious beliefs when the conspiracy is mo-
tivated by a discriminatory animus. Parental concern for the
welfare of their child was held not to be a sufficient defense to
the finding of discriminatory animus.41
Similarly, in Baer v. Baer,42 a United States district court
found that a religious class (the Unification Church) was pro-
tected under section 1985(3), but resisted finding that the stat-
ute prevented parents from kidnapping their child out of a
religious cult. This type of interference, opined the court, was
not the type of obstacle to interstate travel envisioned in Grif-
fin v. Breckenridge,43 a seminal Supreme Court case dealing
with the section 1985(3) cause of action.
Cult members have been largely unsuccessful in obtaining
relief under 42 U.S.C. section 1983.41 Section 1983 allows recov-
39. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 105-07.
40. 657 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Mandelkorn v. Ward, 455
U.S. 907 (1982).
41. Id. at 48.
42. 450 F. Supp. 481 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
43. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 88. For a more thorough background on the use of section
1985(3) by cult members who have been abducted and deprived of various constitu-
tional rights, see Comment, Civil Rights: A Civil Remedy for Religious Deprogram-
ming Victims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (3), 21 WASHBURN L.J. 663 (1982); Comment,
The Deprogramming of Religious Sect Members: A Private Right of Action Under
Section 1985 (3), 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 229 (1979); Casenote, Federal Regulation of Intra-
Family Deprogramming Conspiracies Under the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871: Ward v.
Conner, 23 B.C.L. REV. 789 (1981); Comment, A New Cause of Action For Members of
Religious Groups Suing Their Parents for Attempting To Deprogram Them, 7 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 656 (1984).
44. The full text of the statute is as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Colombia, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable ex-
clusively to the District of Colombia shall be considered to be a statute of the
District of Colombia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981).
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ery for deprivations of constitutional rights by one acting under
"color of law." Courts will not hold that judges who, in good
faith, grant temporary conservatorships to parents (which re-
sult in the deprogramming of the child involved in a religious
cult), have acted under "color of law" for purposes of section
1983."5 In addition, police officers who assist in carrying out a
court order to remove a cult member from the group are nor-
mally given at least partial immunity from prosecution.46
Thus, it is evident that a cause of action under the Civil
Rights Act may be stated if the proper set of circumstances ex-
ist. Indeed, it is imperative that courts continue to expand the
recovery available to cult members under section 1985(3).
B. Conservatorships-A Parent's Salvation?
Since the law regarding the legality of deprogramming is un-
settled, those interested in reasserting control over a cult mem-
ber have resorted to other legal means to accomplish
deprogramming. Frequently these attempts have taken the
form of court-ordered conservatorships.
Statutes exist in every state which authorize court-appointed
conservatorships or guardianships.47 Courts were initially re-
luctant to use conservatorship statutes as a basis for permitting
parents to deprogram their children.48 However, several states
45. The Supreme Court clearly enunciated the principle of absolute judicial im-
munity for acts done in the performance of judicial functions in Pierson v. Ray, 386
U.S. 547, 553-55 (1967). See also Baer v. Baer, 450 F. Supp. 481, 488 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
46. See Vermeire, "Deprogramming": From The Defense Counsel's Perspective,
84 W. VA. L. REV. 91, 107-11 (1981). For an interesting example of a court finding that
police participation in an abduction did satisfy the "color of law" requirement of sec-
tion 1983, see Mandelkorn v. Patrick, 359 F. Supp. 692 (D.D.C. 1973).
47. In California, a conservatorship may be imposed on any adult person, who is
"unable properly to provide for his or her own personal needs for physical health,
food, clothing or shelter. ... " CAL. PROB. CODE § 1801 (West Supp. 1986). Typical of
other guardianship statutes is the Delaware statute that states that a guardian may be
appointed for the mentally infirm or those with physical incapacity that renders them
in danger of "becoming the victims of designing persons." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12
§ 3914 (Supp. 1984).
The Delaware statute contains similar wording to that of the previous California
law. However, in Katz v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 981, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234,
245 (1977), the California Court of Appeal found this language unconstitutionally
broad, and refused to use it to sanction the attempt by parents of five Unification
Church members to obtain guardianships over their children.
48. BRANDON, NEW RELIGIONS, CONVERSIONS AND DEPROGRAMMING: NEW FRON-
TIERS OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 33 (The Center for Law and Religious Freedom, Jan.
1982) (monograph) ("Due to the gradual realization of courts and law enforcement
officials of not only the dangers of deprogramming but also the illegality of private or
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have passed laws specifically designed to give courts the power
to appoint guardians on behalf of incompetent or incapacitated
persons.4 9
Typical of the more aggressive postures taken by a legisla-
ture is the example of the Arizona temporary guardianship
law.50 Under Arizona law, a guardian may be appointed for
anyone so mentally impaired that they "lack sufficient under-
standing or capacity to make or communicate responsible deci-
sions concerning [their] person."'"
Under Arizona law, a judge may waive the notice and hear-
ing requirements of the guardianship laws if an "emergency sit-
uation" arises, necessitating the appointment of a temporary
guardianship.5 2 The thirty day temporary guardianship proce-
dure is a ready vehicle for parents looking for legal authority to
abduct their children and deprogram them out of aberrant be-
lief systems. The Arizona statute has in fact been used for this
precise purpose.5 3 At least seven other states5 4 also use tempo-
rary guardianship statutes as a means of removing cult mem-
bers for the purpose of deprogramming.
The Arizona statute presents significant due process con-
cerns and may be subject to constitutional challenge under the
fourteenth amendment.5 The expansive use of conservator-
court-ordered guardianships under laws not enacted for that purpose, due to such
cases as the Katz case .... there has been a growing trend for legislatures to 'deal with
the cult situation' by introducing bills which would grant a court the power to appoint
a guardian for an incompetent or incapacitated person").
49. The Georgia guardianship statute provides for the appointment of a guardian
for "incapacitated" adults "to the extent that [they] lack sufficient understanding or
capacity to make significant responsible decisions concerning their persons or to the
extent that they are incapable of communicating them." GA. CODE ANN. § 49-601 (1).
(Harrison Supp. 1986).
The Missouri code allows a guardianship to be granted over a "partially disabled
person" which is defined as "one who is unable by reason of any physical or mental
condition to receive and evaluate information or to communicate decisions to such an
extent that he lacks capacity to manage, in part, his financial resources." Mo. ANN.
STAT. 475.010 (12) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
50. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-5101 to -5310 (Supp. 1986).
51. Id. § 14-5101(l).
52. Id. § 14-5310.
53. See Note, Legal Issues in the Use of Guardianship Procedures To Remove
Members of Cults, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 1095, 1103-05 (1976).
54. Maryland, Illinois, Colorado, Kansas, Oklahoma, Texas, and New Mexico.
55. It has been argued that, at a minimum, a temporary guardianship proceeding
should be preceeded by notice, that an adversary hearing should be held within two to
three days of the granting of the guardianship, and that the ward should be repre-
sented by counsel. See Note, supra note 53, at 1120-21.
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ships or guardianships as tools for the suppression of the free
exercise of religion should be of concern to all civil libertarians.
Cult members may have a legitimate cause of action under the
fourteenth amendment when such statutes result in their ab-
duction and deprogramming.
C. Richard Delgado's "Final Solution:" Informed Consent
One of the most vocal proponents of legal intervention
against cults is U.C.L.A. law professor Richard Delgado. Del-
gado has written extensively on the problems of deprogram-
ming, conservatorships, cult practices, and religious freedom.56
Delgado's proposals reflect his increasing concern that cur-
rent legal remedies are ineffective in dealing with the abuses of
the cults. In the late 1970s, Delgado suggested that a criminal
defense of "brainwashing" should be available to cult members
who had been forced to join a cult and had subsequently com-
mitted crimes. He reasoned that mens rea was lacking when a
cult member committed crimes since those crimes were often
attributable to the coercive influence of the cult. 7  As Delgado
stated, the "coercively persuaded defendant's choice to act
criminally was not freely made and, indeed, appears to be not
his choice at all."158 Of course, the defendant must show that
coercive persuasion occurred in the first place in order for the
"brainwashing" defense to be sustained. This, however, is not
an insurmountable obstacle for Delgado since he tends to view
religious conversion as suspect.
59
In 1980, Delgado discussed the possibility of developing a
56. See Delgado, Religious Totalism: Gentle and Ungentle Persuasion Under The
First Amendment, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1977) [hereinafter Religious Totalism]; Del-
gado, Ascription of Criminal States of Mind: Toward a Defense Theory for the Coer-
cively Persuaded ("Brainwashed") Defendant, 63 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1978) [hereinafter
Brainwashed]; Delgado, supra note 10; Delgado, Religious Totalism As Slavery, 9
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 51 (1979-1980) [hereinafter Slavery].
57. This theory of a "transferred mens rea" defense has come under sharp criti-
cism. Commentators have pointed out that such a defense obscures the principle of
free will which underlies the criminal justice system. See Dressler, Professor Del-
gado's "Brainwashing" Defense: Courting A Determinist Legal System, 63 MINN. L.
REV. 335, 341-49 (1979) ("[m]ens rea is not absent in cases of coercive persuasion.
Although theories of the etiology of coercive persuasion abound, all are premised on
the view that the captive comes to share the captor's view, and later commits support-
ive crimes, because he wants - that is, intends - to commit the acts. The intent itself
may derive from any one of various psychological sources but the mens rea is clearly
present." (footnote omitted)).
58. See Brainwashed, supra note 56, at 10.
59. See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
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unique, constitutionally-based action against religious cults.
60
Though courts had intimated about the use of such an action
based on the thirteenth amendment's anti-slavery provision,6
Delgado provided the philosophical framework for such an ar-
gument. Delgado's "slavery analysis" has the advantage of pro-
viding a categorical injunction against certain behavior
regardless of whether the cult member acquiesced in his or her
treatment by the cult.6 2 By relying on the thirteenth amend-
ment's prohibition of slavery, difficult determinations of
whether "brainwashing" or "coercive persuasion" has occurred
can be avoided.63
However, the most drastic legal intervention proposed by
Delgado is that religious proselytizers obtain "informed con-
sent" before engaging in practices that may result in conver-
sion.' Delgado suggests that though such consent need not be
obtained in all encounters, it should be required whenever the
"psychological integrity"65 of the potential convert is at stake or
"self determination" or "autonomy interests"6 6 are threatened.
Delgado claims that such a requirement was not needed before
60. See Slavery, supra note 56.
61. In Turner v. Unification Church, 473 F. Supp. 367, 371 (D.R.I. 1978), off'd, 602
F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1979), the court held that the first amendment's free exercise clause
does not immunize the religious cult leaders from causes of action which allege invol-
untary servitude or intentional tortious activity.
62. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 411, 443 n.78 (1968); see gener-
ally United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133 (1914); Slavery, supra note 56, at 53.
63. In Turner, 473 F. Supp. at 367, the court addressed the "slavery analysis" in
the context of a 19 year-old woman who became involved with Reverend Moon and
the Unification Church. Turner alleged that due to fear and coercion, she was forced
to work long hours in "compulsory service" soliciting money and selling flowers,
candy, and tickets at Unification rallies. Apparently, Ms. Turner received no compen-
sation for her efforts other than food and shelter. She alleged that she was the recipi-
ent of grave physical, emotional, and economic harm. Among other claims, Turner
alleged a cause of action under the thirteenth amendment. The Turner court was
unwilling to imply a civil cause of action based on the thirteenth amendment. How-
ever, the court was clear that it did have the power to create such a remedy, but that it
was not "prudent or appropriate" in this case. See Turner, 473 F. Supp. at 374. The
court found that state tort law provided adequate remedies for the plaintiff. In addi-
tion, the court refused to imply a civil cause of action from several federal anti-peon-
age statutes. Id.
64. See Delgado, supra note 2 at 537.
65. Just when a potential convert's "psychological integrity" is threatened is diffi-
cult to pinpoint. Here lies the crux of the problem, though. There seems to be no
way of realistically determining when the requirement of informed consent is
triggered.
66. Delgado, supra note 2, at 541 n.31 ("Informed consent would serve no purpose
in situations that present no threat to self-determination or autonomy interests").
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the current rise of "hard-core" cults.67 He thus contends that
recent awareness of cult techniques makes it mandatory that
they be controlled in such a drastic fashion.
Delgado sees the cult indoctrination process as a series of
stages. At each stage of involvement, the devotee learns more
about the cult. Simultaneously, however, certain coercive and
psychologically emasculating factors deprive the devotee of the
requisite capacity to choose for himself. The result is that a
"knowledge-capacity" equilibrium is never reached. When the
devotee has the maximum ability to choose for himself, he is
given a minimum amount of knowledge about the group.6" By
the time the devotee has the proper amount of information con-
cerning the goals and techniques of the cult, he is psychologi-
cally unable to extricate himself.69
Informed consent, argues Delgado, will enhance both spiri-
tual and physical integrity and will promote disclosure and
honesty on the part of the cult member.7" A private action in
tort, based on informed consent, would provide a legal remedy
for those who previously lacked such recourse. Delgado claims
that governmental neutrality would be maintained because the
criterion for informed consent would be value neutral.7'
Delgado has attempted to specify the context in which the
requirement of "informed consent" is triggered. The cult re-
cruiter's initial duty is to offer material information at the
point at which "conversion activity" begins. If you ask when
such activity can be deemed to begin, Delgado has this re-
sponse: "If a convert strikes up a conversation, on a bus for ex-
67. Id. at 544-46.
68. See Slavery, supra note 56, at 54-55; R. ENROTH, supra note 2, at 42-43; Smith,
supra note 3, at 1, col. 3 (distasteful information given at timed intervals).
69. See Delgado, supra note 2, at 552 ("At each stage, the intensity of the indoctri-
nation and the convert's dependence on the group increases. The ultimate effect is a
commitment to a journey, each step of which is nominally consented to, but whose
ultimate destination is concealed until the penultimate step - at which point the indi-
vidual has been so prepared that committing his or her life and fortune to the group
seems a small and insignificant step." (footnote omitted)).
70. Id. at 553 ("Informed consent requirements serve a number of purposes: pro-
tecting the individual's interest in psychic or bodily integrity; preserving a sense of
shared venture between the consent-giver and the consent-obtainer; and promoting
visibility and scrutiny of the treatment in question." (footnote omitted)).
71. Delgado contends that the informed consent requirement focuses on a single,
objective event: the proselytizer's disclosure, or lack of disclosure, of information. See
Delgado, supra note 2, at 55 n.121. This, however, seems to avoid the larger question
since it cannot be assumed that the proselytizer needed to provide certain information
in the first place.
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ample, on a neutral subject, the informed consent requirement
does not arise. As soon as the conversation moves in the direc-
tion of interesting the convert in making contact with the
group, offer of disclosure must be made."72
Thus, if the potential devotee expresses a desire for more de-
tailed information, the cult member is required to furnish a
true response. But if the individual does not indicate an inter-
est in getting more information, conversion activity can
proceed.73
At this stage, Delgado would require the proselytizer to re-
veal the name of his group, and to express the fact that the
organization is religious. 4 After this initial revelation, the cult
member would also be required to respond "honestly and fully"
to all questions.75
If this private action in tort, based on informed consent, is
determined not to be viable as a remedy, Delgado suggests sev-
eral other anti-cult measures. Courts could demand a "cooling
off" period in which a new convert would be required to leave
the cult for a few days in order to offset any coercive persuasion
that may have forced him to have originally joined the cult.
76
In addition, Delgado argues that cult members should wear
identification badges, and that educational authorities should
warn school-age youths of the recruitment techniques of reli-
gious proselytizers.77
The remedies proposed by Richard Delgado, though severe,
have fallen on the fertile soil of distraught parents of cultists
and overzealous district attorneys. 7 However, traditional tort
72. Delgado, supra note 2, at 564 n.161. One might query as to how it is deter-
mined when a conversation ends and "conversion activity" begins.
73. Id. at 556.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 557.
76. See Religious Totalism, supra note 56, at 74. See also Delgado, supra note 2, at
557.
77. See Delgado, supra note 2, at 557. In an earlier article, Delgado suggested that
proselytizers inform the potential convert as to the lifestyle that a devotee is expected
to adopt. See Religious Totalism, supra note 56, at 73.
78. The Tucson, Arizona district attorney's office has taken a particularly aggres-
sive posture towards religious cults. Prosecutors in that office have been successful in
assisting parents in obtaining custody of their children who are involved in cults. This
legal process begins with the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, ordering the cult to
produce the member for a court hearing on mental competency. By serving notice on
the cult at pre-dawn hours, the group is unable to remove the member to a foreign
jurisdiction. At the competency hearing, the prosecution offers evidence of radical
personality change. As a result, the judge often grants a 15 to 30 day conservatorship,
COMM/ENT L. J.
remedies have normally been available to both ex-cult mem-
bers and their parents. For example, fraud actions may serve
as a harness on groups that base their proselytizing on misrep-
resentation. Other groups actually use force or the threat of
force to keep converts from leaving,79 and thus may be subject
to tort actions based on assault and battery. A remedy based on
false imprisonment is available for those who have been con-
fined against their will, and who do not perceive a way of es-
cape from the cult.80
Finally, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
may be a means of recovery for ex-cult members against cults
which have used outrageous means to intentionally inflict emo-
tional distress on a cult member. Parents may even be able to
recover by showing that some cults teach their members to
"disown" their parents.81
As the power, influence, and corruption of cults has been ex-
posed, there has been a corresponding increase in the potential
legal remedies available. A host of criminal, constitutional, and
civil actions have been suggested to meet what is perceived as a
life or death struggle against these religious proselytizers. How-
ever, before rushing headlong into a crusade against cults, anti-
cultists would do well to pause and reflect on whether they are
building their house of remedies on the ashheap of the first
amendment.
during which time deprogramming can be accomplished. The hired deprogrammer
works under the supervision of the court psychologist. While a cult member is free to
return to the group at the conclusion of the conservatorship, only one in twenty do so.
See Case Comment, supra note 10, at 473.
79. See Aronin, supra note 10, at 172 ("Even where there are no physical barriers
to departure, psychological pressure and considerations resulting from the remote-
ness of the location may combine effectively to prevent the recruit from leaving until
the cult allows him to do so." (footnotes omitted)); C. EDWARDS, supra note 21, at 78-
79; C. STONER & J. PARKE, supra note 3, at 169.
80. For application of the tort of false imprisonment to deprogramming attempts,
see Case Comment, supra note 10, at 479.
81. Courts can be reluctant, however, to grant relief to a parent based on this
theory. In Meroni v. The Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christi-
anity, 125 Misc. 2d 1061, 480 N.Y.S.2d 706 (1984), the court sustained a demurrer to a
father's action based on intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff's son
had committed suicide after becoming a member of the Unification Church. The
court held that the defendant's actions were not intentionally directed at the victim's
father, and therefore not actionable, as such.
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IV
The Constitution and the Cults
The first amendment to the Constitution is the central focus
in any discussion of the problem of modern day religious
proselytizing. Commentators generally agree that this country
was formed on the basis of a strong commitment to religious
toleration. 2 While no single theory prevailed as to how church
and state should relate, 3 there was a general consensus among
the founding fathers that religious expression should be al-
lowed to flourish, and that Congress should tread lightly in this
sensitive area. 4
However, it was not until 1940, in Cantwell v. Connecticut,
5
that the Supreme Court applied the free exercise clause of the
first amendment to the states. In Cantwell, the Court said:
Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such reli-
gious organization or form of worship as the individual may
choose cannot be restricted by law.... [T]he Amendment em-
braces two concepts - freedom to believe and freedom to act.
The first is absolute, but, in the nature of things, the second
cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the pro-
tection of society. 6
The term "religion" had a fairly precise meaning in nine-
teenth century American jurisprudence. In Davis v. Beason,"
the Court tied the term "religion" to a theistic view of God,
holding that the term "has reference to one's views of his rela-
tions to his Creator, and to the obligations they impose of rever-
ence for his being and character, and of obedience to his will.
'88
82. Forkosch, Religion, Education, and the Constitution-a Middle Way, 23 LoY.
L. REV. 617, 626-32 (1977); Brandon, supra note 48, at 5.
83. Three theories were proposed as a basis for the religion clauses: (1) the "wall
of separation" concept by which the state was to be kept from any significant inter-
play with religion; (2) the separation of church and state to protect the church from
the corrupting influence of the state, thus allowing government to aid, but not in-
fringe, on religion; and (3) governmental abstinence from any intolerance vis-a-vis
religious belief, thereby allowing a free exchange in the marketplace of ideas. See 1
A. STOKES, CHURCH & STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 380 (1950); Everson v. Board of
Education, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947); Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme
Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4 (1961).
84. W. BERNS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOC-
RACY 1-32 (1976).
85. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
86. Id. at 303-04.
87. 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
88. Id. at 342.
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In Torcaso v. Watkins,89 the Supreme Court had a direct op-
portunity to define religion for purposes of the first amend-
ment. Torcaso involved a constitutional challenge to a
Maryland statute which required state officials to declare a be-
lief in God in order to hold state office. The Court unanimously
rejected this requirement, and held that neither the state nor
federal government can make belief in God the litmus test for
religious belief under the first amendment. 90 As a consequence
of this holding, the concept of religion now includes nontheistic
beliefs.
Thus, in United States v. Seeger,91 the Court found that reli-
gious beliefs need not encompass theistic faith provided that
they are "sincere religious beliefs which are based upon a
power or being, or upon a faith, to which all else is subordinate
or upon which all else is ultimately dependent." 92
The Supreme Court case of United States v. Ballard93 typi-
fies the Court's reluctance to rule on the truth or falsity of a
religious belief. The defendants in Ballard were indicted and
convicted for using, and conspiring to use, the mails to defraud.
Guy Ballard, founder of the "I Am" movement, claimed to be a
divine messenger for the "ascertained master," Saint Germain.
Ballard alleged that he had supernatural powers of healing.94
As a result, Ballard felt "moved" to solicit memberships and
contributions for the "I Am" movement.
The Supreme Court, in reversing the court of appeals, held
that the truth of a religious representation may not be judged
in an action for fraud.95 As Justice Douglas opined, the first
amendment allows one to "maintain theories of life and of
death and of the hereafter which are rank heresy to followers
of the orthodox faiths.
'96
89. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
90. Id. at 495.
91. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
92. Id. at 176. See also Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (where the
Supreme Court held that purely ethical or moral beliefs were parallel to belief in a
Supreme Being, and were thus "religious" beliefs for purposes of interpreting a stat-
ute allowing exemption from combat for those who objected on religious grounds).
93. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
94. Id. at 79-80.
95. Id. at 86.
96. Id. For an intriguing look at the Ballard case and the propriety of demanding
"sincerity" as an element of religious belief, see Heins, Other People's Faith: The
Scientology Litigation and the Justiciability of Religious Fraud, 9 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 153 (1981).
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The Constitution, however, does not forbid the government
from restricting religious practice.97 Beginning with the anti-
polygamy decisions9' in the nineteenth century, the Court has
never countenanced illegal behavior masquerading as "reli-
gious belief."99 For instance, state courts have upheld convic-
tions for use of the hallucinogenic drug peyote even though
such use was for "religious purposes."'10 Similarly, the Fifth
Circuit rejected Dr. Timothy Leary's claim that the use of mari-
juana was a formal requisite for the practice of Hinduism, and
thus protected by the first amendment. 1 1 Citing Davis v.
Beason, the court held that "[c]rime is not the less odious be-
cause sanctioned by what any particular sect may designate as
religion.'
10 2
The state may infringe on an individual's free exercise of
religion if there is a compelling state interest and such regula-
tion is within the state's constitutional power. 0 3 Thus, while
religious groups may believe that they should deceive the pub-
lic in order to solicit funds, such practices are properly subject
to state regulation." 4 As the Court stated in Sherbert v. Ver-
97. Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851, 859 (5th Cir. 1967) ("The freedom to act is
conditional and relative and Congress may prescribe and enforce certain conditions to
control conduct which may be contrary to a person's religious beliefs in the interest of
the public welfare and protection of society").
98. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333
(1890).
99. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167 (The Court held that to excuse unlawful practices
because of religious belief "would be to make the professed doctrines of religious be-
lief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a
law unto himself"). However, religious organizations are exempt from employment
discrimination charges under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1
(1982), as long as they present "convincing evidence" that religious conviction moti-
vated the employment decision. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v.
Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477, 485 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981).
100. State v. Bullard, 267 N.C. 599, 148 S.E.2d 565 (1966); State v. Big Sheep, 75
Mont. 219, 243 P. 1067, 1073 (1926) (the Court held that it was within the power of the
legislature to determine whether the practice of using peyote was inconsistent with
the good order, peace, and safety of the state).
101. Leary, 383 F.2d at 860. Courts, on the basis of a compelling state interest in
the health and welfare of society, have consistently upheld statutes restricting snake-
handling and the ingestion of poison even if it is claimed that they play a central role
in religious expression. See Harden v. State, 188 Tenn. 17, 20, 216 S.W.2d 708, 710
(1949); Swann v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99, 110 (Tenn. 1975); Comment, Snakehandling and
Freedom of Religion, WASH. U.L.Q. 353 (1976).
102. Leary, 383 F.2d at 860.
103. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
104. In Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness Inc., 452 U.S.
640, 650-654 (1981), the Court held that a state can require a religious organization to
limit its sales and solicitations at a state fair to an assigned location, and that such a
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ner, "While the freedom to harbor religious beliefs is absolute,
the freedom to engage in religious practices is not."'1 5
The standard of "compelling state interest" has been given
definitional substance by the Court. Such a restriction of first
amendment protections may be allowed if: (1) there is a con-
flicting governmental interest of such importance as to be
deemed compelling; and (2) there is no alternative for protect-
ing that interest other than to limit the free exercise of reli-
gion."' A compelling state interest is not shown merely by
demonstrating that a certain religious belief is illogical, incom-
prehensible, or inconsistent.10 7  In short, the Court has at-
tempted to embrace the principle, first enunciated in
Cantwell,' that the freedom to believe is absolute while the
freedom to act is not.
The various proposals designed to limit cult activity hold seri-
ous ramifications for first amendment freedoms. At least one
commentator has argued that "legal deprogramming" through
court-ordered conservatorships is simply a process of forcing
children to repudiate beliefs which their parents deem unac-
ceptable. 10 9 Such activity is considered by many, however, to be
socially useful, and thus not coercive.'
Terms like "brainwashing," "coercive persuasion," and "in-
limitation is a reasonable time, place and manner restriction of a first amendment
freedom.
105. 374 U.S. 398, 402-403 (1963). Under the Sherbert test, later refined in Wiscon-
sin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (a case holding that exempting Amish children from
state compulsory education laws was a reasonable accomodation of religion under the
free exercise clause), the government must present a compelling interest in support of
the restriction of the first amendment right of freedom of religion, and must show
that such a restriction is the least restrictive means possible to accomplish the legiti-
mate governmental objective.
106. Pfeffer, The Supremacy of Free Exercise, 61 GEO. L.J. 1115 (1973).
107. Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, 450
U.S. 707, 714 (1980) ("The determination of what is a religious belief or practice is
more often than not a difficult and delicate task.... However, the resolution of that
question is not to turn upon a judicial perception of the particular belief or practice in
question; religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensi-
ble to others in order to merit First Amendment protection").
108. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303 (1940).
109. Alan Seher, director of West Coast legal affairs for the Unification Church
says that "the court has begun to realize that what has been euphemistically called
deprogramming is basically a coercive effort to force repudiation of belief." Buel,
supra note 32, at 62.
110. See Slavery, supra note 56, at 65; see generally Note, supra note 53; Mitchell,
infra note 119.
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formed consent" '111 are nebulous terms at best, and provide the
broadest basis possible for intervention." 2 Notions of free will
are ignored as cult members take on the status of automatons-
persons who have not chosen a lifestyle and philosophy, but are
the passive subjects of manipulation. Such a view leads to a
type of legal paternalism where the state, acting in its parens
pattie capacity, "saves" all those involved in aberrant religious
organizations. 13  Terms like "mind control" and "brain-
washing" evoke images of mental incompetence, and thus be-
come vehicles by which cult members may be both stigmatized
and controlled.1 4 Such a focus shifts attention to the subjective
and previously protected domain of individual religious belief.
V
God In The Dock 5
Parents and ex-cult members are being given increasingly
greater legal remedies to combat forms of religious expression
that previously were seen as protected by the first amendment.
It is clear that religious expression should be protected, while
fraudulent and illegal cult practices should continue to be the
subjects of traditional civil and criminal remedies.1 6 However,
111. Robbins, Religious Movements, the State, and the Law: Reconceptualizing
"The Cult Problem", 9 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 33, 40 (1979-1980); LeMoult,
Deprogramming Members of Religious Sects, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 599, 634 (1978).
112. Robbins, supra note 111, at 37 ("Mind control thereby becomes a borderline
concept, whose use permits the stigmatization of cults and the advocacy of control
measures (for example, court-ordered deprogramming)").
113. The Constitution does not, however, forbid government from acting on the
basis of a determination that religious beliefs are injurious. In Mayock v. Martin, 157
Conn. 56, 245 A.2d 574 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 111 (1969), the court held that it
did not offend a person's first amendment rights to detain them in a mental institu-
tion on the ground that they held injurious religious beliefs. Mayock, a self-pro-
claimed prophet, had already taken out one of his eyes (in thanksgiving for a
revelation) and severed one of his hands (done as a result of a "covenant" with God).
There was a medical determination that Mayock would probably harm himself fur-
ther if not restrained. Query whether Jehovah's Witnesses have a constitutional right
to refuse medically necessary blood transfusions. See Comment, Their Life Is In The
Blood: Jehovah's Witnesses, Blood Transfusions and the Courts, 10 N. KY. L. REV.
281, 300 (1983).
114. See Robbins, supra note 111, at 38 (the acceptance of these concepts "contin-
ues a disturbing trend away from assigning responsibility to the individual for his
acts").
115. C.S. Lewis, the eminent Oxford scholar and author, first coined this phrase to
express how contemporary man has changed in his view of his own position before
any Deity. See C.S. LEWIS, GOD IN THE DOCK: ESSAYS ON THEOLOGY AND ETHICS
(1970).
116. See supra note 27.
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government support of forced deprogramming is constitution-
ally indefensible.
Illegal abductions are often viewed as purely family matters.
Thus, judges and juries are reluctant to find a parent liable for
the forced abduction of his child.11 It is reasoned that, based
on a "choice of evils" criterion, parents often act on a reason-
able belief that the health and well-being of their children is at
stake.118 Thus, the truth or falsity of religious beliefs is ruled
on, and courts continue to usurp formerly sacrosanct ground.
Such a result does violence to the first amendment and the pro-
nouncements of the Supreme Court in Ballard and Cantwell
that the truth or falsity of religious beliefs is not within the
purview of the courts.
Conservatorships should be allowed only if the cult member
is found to be "gravely disabled" or "severely incapacitated."'" 9
Furthermore, mere involvement in a cult which has debatably
harmful effects on one's health should not subject one to court-
ordered conservatorship-it is the right of a devotee to choose a
lifestyle that others consider harmful. The state should not be
involved in determining optimum levels of spiritual health. In
short, Richard Delgado's view that cult members should be res-
cued from slavery and coercive persuasion, whether they want
help or not, should be seen as an authoritarian challenge in its
own right.
The ambiguity in terminology puts the constitutionality of
many guardianship statutes in doubt. These statutes invite
117. Buel, supra note 32, at 61 ("Civil judgments against deprogrammers are rela-
tively rare, criminal convictions even rarer, and when damages are awarded, critics of
deprogramming say, they are usually too small to discourage similar conduct by other
families"). See also Robbins, supra note 111, at 39-40.
118. In People v. Patrick, 126 Cal. App. 3d 952, 179 Cal. Rptr. 276 (1981), the de-
fendant asserted the defense of necessity to charges of false imprisonment and kid-
napping, arising out of his abduction of a cult member for purposes of
deprogramming. Ted Patrick, the defendant, claimed that since the subjective belief
of the cult member's parents as to the danger to their daughter was justifiable, Pat-
rick himself was entitled, as the parent's agent, to the necessity defense. The court
rejected this claim, holding that Patrick took no action to independently assure him-
self that the daughter was a member of a cult or that forcible abduction and
deprogramming was the only reasonable alternative available. See generally Arnolds
and Garland, The Defense of Necessity in Criminal Law; The Right to Choose the
Lesser Evil, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 289 (1974).
119. Temporary conservatorships were originally developed to protect the inter-
ests of the elderly and senile. Such statutes are subject to great abuse if applied to
"aberrant" youth involved in religious cults. See Mitchell, The Objects of Our Wisdom
and Our Coercion: Involuntary Guardianship for Incompetents, 52 S. CAL. L. REV.
1405, 1407-1408 (1979); Robbins, supra note 111, at 41.
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courts to examine the validity of religious beliefs, and are sub-
ject to a challenge based on the first amendment. The eviscera-
tion of the Constitution inevitably results when the truth or
falsity of religious beliefs are put in the dock. An example of a
statute that would have posed a serious threat to the Cantwell
and Ballard line of cases was the proposed anti-conversion stat-
ute in New York. The statute defined "[a]brupt and drastic al-
teration of basic value and lifestyle" as suspect behavior.120
Commentators were quick to point out that such a definition
would surely include "born-again" Christians, charismatic
movement members, and certain Roman Catholic and Episco-
pal renewal group members.'
2'
Hostility to all religious belief, save that of the most anemic,
noncontroversial type, can be seen in many of the recent anti-
cult proposals. Delgado has gradually increased the severity of
his suggestions, culminating in the proposal for "informed con-
sent. ' 122 Moreover, Delgado's writings demonstrate a hostility
to even the most traditional and historically accepted forms of
religious expression. For example, he cites the works of John
Calvin and John Knox as illustrations of men who stressed pas-
sive acceptance of religious beliefs akin to that advocated by
modern cult leaders. 23 Many would doubtless find such a char-
acterization of these two leaders of the Protestant Reformation
alarming.
Delgado appears to accept the fact that people may not be
involved in a cult because of coercive persuasion. 24 However,
120. New York Assembly Bill 7912-B, March 31, 1981, cited in Aronin, supra note
10, at 201. For an in-depth look at the New York Bill, see Aronin, supra note 10, at
201-209.
121. Brandon, supra note 48, at 51-52 (Though Brandon's comments were directed
at anti-conversion bills in general, and an Ohio anti-conversion statute specifically,
they are equally on target as to the New York law).
122. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
123. See Delgado, supra note 2, at 554 (Delgado appears to be grossly misinformed
about both Knox and Calvin. Faith, for these two men, was not a passive act void of
critical inquiry. Religious commitment for these classical Protestant Reformers was
the highest act of intelligent self-determination, since it was based on "good and con-
vincing evidence" for the historicity of the Christian claims. If Delgado finds the cul-
tic shadow in the life and writings of Knox and Calvin, historic Protestantism itself
must surely be suspect. For insight on the Protestant Reformers, see P. SCHAFF, THE
CREEDS OF CHRISTENDOM, 203-09 (6th ed. 1983); 2 K. S. LATOURETTE, A HISTORY OF
CHRISTIANITY, 689-998 (1975); 9 THE NEW SCHAFF-HERZOG ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELI-
GIOUS KNOWLEDGE, 417-25 (1912), s.v. Reformation.
124. See Delgado, supra note 2, at 540 ("Many find contentment, even joy in the
group and view any costs associated with their conversion as acceptable." (footnote
omitted)).
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what Delgado gives with the right hand he takes away with the
left. Even though one says he is voluntarily involved with a
religious group, Delgado would allow actions under the thir-
teenth amendment to force these "deceived" believers to be re-
leased. Under this view, there is little reason why those in
monasteries and nunneries would not be subject to such actions
under the thirteenth amendment.
This points out the central difficulty in the attempt to limit
cult proselytizing-the effort to distinguish a cult from a "legit-
imate" religion for first amendment purposes. "Cults" are sub-
ject to control but "religions" are immune. Therefore, cults
must be distinguished from "legitimate" religions for first
amendment purposes. Such a distinction is a chimerical dream.
As commentators have pointed out, the cults of 100 years ago
are the established religions of today.12 Distinctions based on
such differences in terminology are repulsive to first amend-
ment values. The inevitable result is that religious belief will be
brought before the bar of secular justice.
VI
What Hath God Wrought?
The practices of religious cults have resulted in a myriad of
legal responses. While this note has attempted to point out the
grave dangers these responses pose for first amendment free-
doms, there are still at least two lessons to be learned from the
current onslaught against cults.
First, religious practice has never been seen as being immune
from criminal and civil liability.126 As the case law demon-
strates, litigation based on traditional tort remedies such as
fraud and false imprisonment will and should be brought
against offending religious groups. It is becoming increasingly
evident that courts and juries are growing impatient with at-
tempts by cults and religious groups to veil illegal and culpable
activity in the guise of "religious practice."
Second, while the backlash against cults may be understand-
able, our nation was founded on the concept that religious posi-
tions, no matter how bizzare or indefensible, should be allowed
to compete in the marketplace of ideas. By removing religious
cults from that marketplace, we necessarily place our impri-
125. Pfeffer, supra note 10, at 9-10.
126. Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145; Davis, 133 U.S. 333.
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matur on certain acceptable types of religious expression.
There is little, though, to prevent courts from someday holding
that acceptable "orthodox" religious viewpoints are based on
coercive persuasion, and thus illegal.1
27
This note is then a plea-a plea to parents, district attorneys,
judges, and practitioners, who in an attempt to deal with repul-
sive religious beliefs and practices have failed to heed the an-
cient parable that speaks of those who toiled long and hard to
rid their house of a demon, only to later find that seven more
had returned to fill the vacancy.
128
In attempting to rid society of the alleged "demon" of the
cults, parents and officers of the court would do well to look at
what may be coming in the back door.
127. For a particularly disturbing example of a self-proclaimed "cult expert" who
appears more than willing to support the control of "extreme" religious groups, see L.
STREIKER, THE GOSPEL TIME BOMB: ULTRAFUNDAMENTALISM AND THE FUTURE OF
AMERICA (1984).
128. Matthew 12:45 (King James).

